To counter the fall in equities and monetary investment funds (linked to liquidity and therefore the prerogative of small savers), the administration of GW Bush has launched a public intervention that is unparalleled in either US economic history or that of the history of capitalism: the State has, in fact, decided to absorb the insolvency risk mortgages and insolvable loans of banks and financial institutions for an estimated total of between 500 and 1000 billion US $, a figure equal to almost 7% of the GDP (or the entire GDP of states such as Mexico), which is in addition to the 800 billion allocated to buffer the crisis that occurred in the stock market (including the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund, created in era of the Great Depression). Contrary to what happened during the biggest post-war crash, when the savings banks collapsed and when the government created the Resolution Trust Corporation (1989), a body specifically designed to liquidate the assets of the hundreds of banks involved, taking on directly the control of failed institutions, with the entire provision the US state has decided to take on only the debts of financial institutions, without intervening on the governance processes (thus jeopardizing the recovery of the sector) and pouring the weight of this massive intervention entirely on federal budget. According to businesscarriers, the state intervention plan was called Tarp (Troubled asset relief program) and provided for several central interventions in the US economy, including nationalization actions. It therefore marked the end of the long period of Reaganese deregulation following which the basic rules in the granting of loans had been eliminated and the separation between traditional banking and investment banking was weakened . In the face of greater control, with the Tarp, 7700 billion dollars of liquidity (disbursed at almost zero rates) were placed on the American market, in support of national banks, but also, implicitly, of many other world financial systems. In this context, Lehman Brothers however, it did not receive the disbursement of state funds, accentuating the severe crisis of the world stock exchange and the screwing up of overseas stock exchanges. This strong jolt led the Fed, in autumn 2008, to make a further reduction in discount rates and inject new liquidity into the banking system, but this action was not enough to reverse the global impact of the American crisis. In the first quarter of 2009 recession phenomena equal to those of 1929 were realized, which were followed by large problems of unemployment and a reduction in the propensity and real spending capacity of American families.
The consequent increase in the propensity to save, which touched the few available capital, definitively weakened aggregate demand, accentuating the recession and unemployment (especially among young people). In this crisis, the first signs of recovery were given by the rise in the prices of raw materials (especially industrial ones), primarily by the emerging economies. After the negative peak in the first quarter of 2009, the US economy began to recover, reaching growth of 5.6% in the last quarter of 2009 and 2.2% in the first months of 2010. This growth was induced, on the industrial level, by a recovery in consumption and a greater accumulation of inventories; from the recovery of exports and public spending, supported by a new expansionary maneuver, worth 787 billion dollars, approved by the government chaired by B. Obama. In this context, however, unemployment rates remained high (17%), wages were continuously falling (mortgages absorb 63% of gross income) and strong social and trade union tensions arose again, accentuated by the risk of new speculative phenomena. In fact, at the end of 2011, the consequences of the dramatic crisis are still visible and there was still widespread concern in banks for subprime securities.and, among citizens, a new financial bubble and possible foreclosures of houses from families. The corrections induced by the US government to the local and world economy have, in fact, given them respite, but have not remedied the existing causes of the “stumbling blocks” of the financial system: the management of this crisis, at a central level, has been more oriented towards a support from the banks, which were granted time to recover the heavy losses suffered, but the structural points of the system were not touched and the collapse of the real estate market, triggered by insolvable loans (mortgages) led to a strong reduction in value housing, on which many citizens have very expensive mortgages (set according to the system of increasing installments over time). This anomaly, added to the strong unease of widespread unemployment, it led to a reduction in the financial resources of many families, which were followed by difficulties in payments and concrete risks of recession. In fact, in mid-2011, the US public debt was still growing disproportionately, the risks associated with real estate credit could not yet be dispelled and the Congressional Budget Office had foreseen a tangible risk of default, confirmed by the first case in history. cutting of American debt rating by Standard & Poor’s (August 2011). The agreement of August 2011 between Republicans and Democrats seems to have removed the risk of US bankruptcy and the real growth forecasts of the United States of America see a scenario that is not dramatic, but its crucial issues have not been resolved.